

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STUDY OF MINISTERIAL STABILITY, RESHUFFLES AND TURNOVER

The article is devoted to analyzing the content, nature and features of the concept of “ministerial stability”. The author considered the ways of influencing and interconnecting between ministerial and cabinet stability and highlighted the ways of analyzing ministerial stability. It was stated that ministerial reshuffles, ministerial turnover and ministerial stability explain and clarify cabinet stability, although they are directly dependent on the factors that determine cabinet stability. The study also noted that ministerial stability can be positioned as an independent factor in the study of cabinet activity, as it can independently answer the questions concerning the peculiarities of formation, functioning and responsibility of cabinets. Thus, the researcher found out that ministerial stability and ministerial reshuffles depend on such factors as the level of uncertainty in the choice of a potential official of a cabinet, the importance of political and technical expert skills of the future official, the degree of inter-ministerial trust in a cabinet, restrictions for appointments and dismissals of cabinet’s ministers. At the same time, ministerial stability is largely determined by the importance of different ministerial positions, which is crucial for both parties and individual politicians.

Keywords: government, cabinet, ministerial stability, cabinet stability, ministerial reshuffles, ministerial volatility, ministerial alternation.

ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ ЗАСАДИ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ МІНІСТЕРСЬКОЇ СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ, ПЕРЕСТАНОВОК Й ОБІГУ МІНІСТРІВ

Проаналізовано зміст, сутність і особливості поняття «міністерська стабільність». Розглянуто способи впливу та взаємозв'язку міністерської й урядової стабільності, а на цій підставі виділено способи аналізу міністерської стабільності. Констатовано, що міністерські перестановки, міністерський обіг і міністерська стабільність пояснюють та уточнюють урядову стабільність, хоча й безпосередньо залежать від чинників, які зумовляють урядову стабільність. Також у дослідженні зауважено, що міністерська стабільність може позиціонуватись і як самостійний чинник дослідження урядової

діяльності, адже вона самостійно може відповісти на питання, які стосуються особливостей формування, функціонування та відповідальності урядів. На цьому тлі з'ясовано, що міністерська стабільність і міністерські перестановки залежать від таких чинників, як рівень невпевненості у виборі потенційного посадовця урядового кабінету, важливість політичних і технічних експертних навиків майбутнього посадовця, ступінь міжміністерської довіри в уряді, обмеження призначень і звільнень міністрів урядового кабінету. Водночас міністерська стабільність значною мірою детермінована врахуванням важливості різних міністерських посад, яка визначальна як для партій, так і для окремих політиків тощо.

Ключові слова: уряд, урядовий кабінет, міністерська стабільність, урядова стабільність, перестановки міністрів, міністерська мінливість, міністерське чергування.

Comparative political scientists have long expressed interest in the issue of government stability in regard of change and reshuffle of individual cabinet members. Since unstable government offices tend to form unstable political regimes, while political instability leads to the transfer of power from elected political actors to unelected bureaucrats, it prevents political actors from responding to the challenges of political change. For such a reason the issues of reshuffles and individual ministers stability are of utmost relevance, their operationalization putting extra emphasis on the notion of government stability, which received ample exploration in modern comparative political science. Even given the fact that resignation of an individual minister, as well as the redistribution of government portfolios or new ministerial appointments, which can often require special and additional approval always serves as an indicator of government stability. The point is that a minister's resignation typically occurs by decision and / or consent of the prime minister, or as a result of a loss of parliamentarians' confidence, and is carried out either by the head of state or (really seldom) by the head of government. Despite his broad constitutional powers, the Prime Minister cannot take a dictatorial stance in a democratic country. The internal structures of the largest political parties are created in such a manner that even powerful prime ministers can be easily dismissed as a result of losing support of most party members. Further on, the controversy of the abovementioned processes is aggravated by the fact that the Prime Minister, who traditionally defines the government's course and identifies with a cabinet stability, has only one voice, likewise other cabinet members. As a result, in his or her activities, the Prime Minister should take into account the situation within the government, as a result ministerial reshuffles and ministerial stability serve as additional indicators of the government stability as such.

Respectively, the objective of the proposed study is primarily to understand the theoretical and methodological principles, peculiarities and dimensions of governmental stability through internal government offices processes, including the reshuffle and ministerial turnover. The

stated objective stipulates carrying out the following general and specific research tasks as: defining the very notions of «government stability» and «ministerial stability»; contemplating the factors that determine the dependency of government and ministerial stability; defining theoretical and methodological content of the following notions: e.g. ministerial shift, ministerial reshuffle and turnover, as well as ministerial volatility. The stated issues were explored in scientific treatises of numerous researchers, such as як D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks¹, D. Baron², D. Diermeier and A. Merlo³, L. Dodd⁴, D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran⁵, K. Strom⁶, M. Laver, N. Schofield and K. Shepsle⁷, J. Huber and C. Martinez-Gallardo⁸, and the like. We aim at generalizing and structuring, and a certain update of the existing scientific information, regarding the issues of ministerial reshuffles and turnover as well as ministerial stability.

In order to carry out these research tasks it is worth mentioning that government stability should be understood in the following ways: in a broad sense it is the ability of the government to remain in the line of duty, whereas in a narrow sense it is a steady state of government operation, characterized by its ability to last for a long time, pertaining to it defining internal and external parameters. Such a definition requires that to better understand government activities and stability, it is expedient to employ the term «ministerial stability», once proposed by J. Ziller along with the notion of «governmental stability» and presupposing alternation (turnover) of governments with different leadership and composition⁹. In this light it is apparent that ministerial stability is the «longevity» of individuals, holding respective offices in government cabinets¹⁰. With this in mind it is worth mentioning that the study of government cabinets stability or instability above all focuses on the analysis of boundary indicators (events and institutes). For this reason for «termination» of government cabinets the following criteria

¹ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes, *"American Political Science Review"* 1988, vol 82, s. 405–422.

² Baron D., A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, *"American Political Science Review"* 1998, vol 92, s. 137–164; Baron D., Government Formation and Endogenous Parties, *"American Political Science Review"* 1993, vol 87, s. 34–47; Baron D., Ferejohn J., Bargaining in Legislatures, *"American Political Science Review"* 1989, Vol 83, s. 1181–1206.

³ Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *"Journal of Economic Theory"* 2000, vol 94, s. 46–79; Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101–131.

⁴ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.

⁵ Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

⁶ Strom K. *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Strom K. Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1984, vol 79, s. 738–754.

⁷ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda*, [w:] *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in Honor of J. F. Blondel*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994; Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, *"American Political Science Review"* 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889; Laver M., Shepsle K., Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1998, vol 42, s. 28–55; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

⁸ Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1998, vol 92, s. 577–591; Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., Cabinet Instability and Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 2004, vol 34, s. 27–48; Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

⁹ Ziller Z., *Politiko-administrativni sistemy krayin ES. Porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. Osnovy 1996.

¹⁰ Ziller Z., *Politiko-administrativni sistemy krayin ES. Porivnyalnyi analiz*, Wyd. Osnovy 1996, c. 203.

should be distinguished: formal and voluntary resignations, parliamentary confidence votes, changes in the party composition of government cabinets, interventions of the head of state, and regular or early elections (parliamentary or presidential). Respectively, the government stability, manifested in their duration, is the amount of time between certain boundary indicators (events and institutes), the data and metering results of which are used to test various arguments about variables, either affecting or not affecting the likelihood of boundary events and institutes. The application of the boundary events and institutes approach reflects significant aspects of coalition politics and governance in political systems with government stability, largely dependent on the legislature. In this regard, the key determining indicators of government stability metering are the direct aspects and characteristics of coalitions (the number of parties, majority or minority status in relation to the legislative composition, as well as ideological diversity of parties), institutional rules and regulations (vote on introduction to the office (investiture vote), termination of duties (censure vote), as well as election laws that outline the formation of different types of party systems), expected and real (primarily socio-economic, less political) i) outcomes of the government performance, and additional dynamic factors (e.g., the number of days until the next election). Therefore, the link between theory, empirical evidence and complex methods of assessing ministerial stability demonstrates that the stated issues are among the most topical areas of exploration and clarification of governmental stability.

Based on institutional factors, it is apparent that theoretical assumptions on ministerial stability, ministerial reshuffle, and ministerial turnover must be contemplated in line with normative and institutional arguments, which are less than slightly related to the types of parliamentary democracies (i.e., systems of parliamentary democracies with governments accountable either to parliaments or to both parliaments and heads of state). This originated from the interest of scholars, identifying varieties of democracies (majority or consensus), leading to an increase in government stability, and, consequently, the stability of the government ministerial composition. In addition, outlining different types of systems questions which of the abovementioned types generate not only longer, but more efficient and «fair» (in the context of representation) government cabinets¹¹. The situation is further altered by the fact that government stability depends not only on boundary events and institutes, but on a number of other factors, as well. For instance, it frequently happens that upon the resignation of government cabinets (as executive power institutions), the same parties, even politicians receive an opportunity to preserve the previous ministerial portfolios. Therefore, while looking into government stability, comparative political scientists need to be particularly vigilant when pointing out differences between the government cabinets stability and ministerial stability. The key to defining ministerial stability in this context is the continuity of ministerial staff, suggesting the necessary experience for effective governance and can be viewed as a characteristic feature even in conditions of high thresholds of government instability. Moreover, one should

¹¹ Powell B., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 2000.

be aware that the boundary events and institutes approach is virtually incapable of accounting for reshuffles in government cabinets that occur between border fields. This is crucial given that actual changes and reshuffles of government portfolios can be utterly significant and topical. For example, J. Huber and S. Martinez-Gallardo argue that, for example, Italy with extremely low government stability, is characterized by a quite high stability of the personal ministerial composition of successive government cabinets. Alternatively, the United Kingdom, demonstrating high levels of government stability, is characterised by a significant level of ministerial reshuffles in each cabinet and in the sequence of government cabinets. It presupposes that a country can rank better in ministerial stability, even demonstrating worse government stability indices. Therefore the implications of assessing a correlation between government and ministerial stability can vary. To sum up, it is obvious that reshuffles and turnover of individual cabinet ministers may considerably differ from the turnover and duration of government cabinets¹².

Consequently, one should be aware that it is appropriate to analyze ministerial stability as an independent variable beyond government cabinets versus the stability of governments as such. Hence, one of the research tasks is to analyze factors, affecting individual shifts and reshuffles of ministers within government cabinets, and especially the way the latter as well as the ministerial turnover differ from governmental stability. In this context, perhaps the most effective research perspective is an assumption, according to which ministerial reshuffle should be interpreted primarily as the result of appointing politicians to key government offices and search for talent among those in the running for ministerial offices. However, even in this context, the interpretation of ministerial stability largely depends on the interpretation of governmental stability. undoubtedly, the termination of government cabinets occurs due to the loss and imbalance of the indicators, determining either government or coalition agreement whatsoever. This fact links the study of the government stability with the study of government cabinets formation along with the appointment of individual ministers to various offices¹³. In this context, L.Dodd put forward an idea to define «disorder or change in the party coalition within the government cabinet as any alternation in the ministerial portfolios allocation among parties» or merely as «considerable changes in allocation of portfolios»¹⁴. This definition is based on the interest in the ministerial posts allocation through the prism of policy and political goals of government parties. However, any change in the allocation of ministerial portfolios equals to a change in «the so-called payments» over political expectations of the parties concerned, since a policy is managed through close / direct association with the ministries of

¹² Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., Cabinet Instability and Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective, *British Journal of Political Science* 2004, vol 34, s. 27–48.

¹³ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.; Powell B., *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.; Riker W., *Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁴ Dodd L., *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976, s. 122.

the government cabinet. Yet the question is whether a particular minister exercises a complete control over the policies of his office if, for example, a government cabinet is intended to be a team, or if changes in ministerial composition of a government cabinet do not lead to changes in the political process.

In this regard M.Laver and K.Shepsle¹⁵ elaborated a model of a stable portfolio allocation and attributed to the notion of government cabinets «termination» the status of peculiar exogenous factors and even «strikes» on the posits and political preferences of parties and government cabinets they formed. Likewise A.Lupia and K.Strom¹⁶ argued, that a decision about government cabinets «termination» and formation of new governments is bound to depend on the dynamic processes of ministerial formation in certain countries, since the government composition determines the operational capacity of governments¹⁷. In addition, M. Laver and K. Shepsle emphasize the importance of ministerial voting in government cabinets. Scientists suggest that it is mostly about voting when the government decisions require the consent of most ministers. However, in the case of a coalition government cabinet, voting can facilitate the formation of micro-ministerial groups within the cabinet that are able to significantly influence government stability and effectiveness. Such peculiarities suggest that the decision to form a government always comes as the result of an equilibrium due to the conclusion of an agreement among political actors with various political advantages, and instead the decision to dismiss a cabinet always violates such equilibrium due to the impact of exogenous factors or exogenous shocks. Under the analyzed conditions, the most important is that it is the exogenous factors and shocks, responsible for government resignations, are obviously the central categories of ministerial reshuffles and ministerial turnover investigation. Certainly, the change in portfolios and posts in the government cabinet is inevitably the result of the distribution of preferences and resources of political actors and party leaders.

As a matter of fact, party leaders cannot be absolutely certain of reliability and efficiency of candidates for ministerial posts. This peculiarity is accompanied by a component of trust in particular ministers. Therefore, the research task is to identify political variables that affect the process of ministerial appointments. Thus, as a rule, four relevant factors are pointed out: the level of uncertainty in the selection of a potential government official; the importance of political and technical expertise of a future official; the degree of inter-ministerial trust in government; restriction of appointments and dismissals of cabinet ministers¹⁸. In case of a high level of the party leaders' uncertainty about their party representatives in the cabinet, they are likely to appoint less competent people. However, since a low competence level is an

¹⁵ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, *"American Political Science Review"* 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889.

¹⁶ Lupia A., Strom K., Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, *"American Political Science Review"* 1995, vol 89, s. 648–665.

¹⁷ Diermeier D., Merlo A., Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, *"Journal of Economic Theory"* 2000, vol 94, s. 46–79.; Merlo A., Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment, *"Journal of Political Economy"* 1997, vol 105, s. 101–131.

¹⁸ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

indicator of inefficient performance, the appointed officials will be replaced, the fact leading to a ministerial reshuffle. In general, uncertainty who will make successful ministers is reducing on condition of successful parties and effective processes within the parties attend each other, or when the political system enables them to better identify themselves. Apart from that, the variables related to the uncertainty level include the following: firstly, experience of a democratic system. Office insecurity is the highest in the earliest years of democracy. Therefore, when the cabinet forming experience is too low, it will not only lead to a lack of people with the needed management skills and expertise, but to a lack of trustworthy information on successful leadership and effective ministries requirements; secondly, political competition. The fact is that by appointing people who are the least suitable for ministerial posts, political competition diminishes uncertainty levels about uniting government officials. It is therefore obvious that major government parties and parliaments should attempt to reduce the frequency of ministerial reshuffles, mitigating uncertainty about the most qualified candidates¹⁹. Moreover, the presence of experienced officials reduces the frequency of ministerial reshuffles in a government cabinet, especially when such reshuffles have a significant impact on the political process²⁰.

The impact of talent and professionalism upon ministerial reshuffles and ministerial turnover is determined by the process of peculiar monitoring and «screening» that precedes the any government cabinet formation. Screening (monitoring) of people should be most cautious in situations of significant exogenous and political influences. If, for example, the Minister of Energy and Environmental Protection is solely responsible for creating and implementing aeronautical legislation, then the Minister of the Environment will have a considerably larger influence on the policy outcomes than jointly brought in aeronautical legislation, decided on in a government cabinet and implemented through an open administrative process, providing all cabinet ministers with significant political influence. Therefore, in such a case political actors are expected to be particularly cautious about appointing all relevant ministers. This means that effective screening for ministerial posts should increase the likelihood of identifying expert officials. This means that ministerial reshuffles and turnover reduces whereas ministerial stability increases under the circumstances of ministers' significant influence on government policy²¹. On the other hand, the political influence of sectoral ministers varies depending on both the political systems and the ministerial portfolios allocation in the government cabinet. The point is that, just as some political systems create more opportunities for ministerial influence on politics than other political systems, so do some ministerial portfolios, providing plentiful opportunities for influencing the political process outcomes, as they are based on a greater technical and political experience. In this light, it is not surprising that senior and high-ranking

¹⁹ Strom K. *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

²⁰ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²¹ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

political figures typically hold key ministerial posts in foreign affairs and finance, which are certainly subject to the most intense monitoring and screening.

The intensity of ministerial reshuffles and ministerial selection is also linked to confidence. The point is that a government official can be very experienced, but if he or she pursues a policy other than vision of other cabinet members and the general government's course, his or her experience is not welcomed by officials. Researchers therefore believe that conditions provoking mistrust in ministerial appointments should undergo more rigorous screening²². It should be borne in mind that there are several variables of inter-ministerial distrust. Among those is the existence of a coalition government. Thus, if hypothetical parties A and B are to share ministerial portfolios, then they will seek to ensure that portfolios, assigned to the other party are given to credible people in the sense that they will have a moderate advantage, not resulting in the loss of delegation. Respectively, ministers in coalition governments are more likely to be more resilient than in single-party, majority or minority governments, and technocratic government cabinets.

However, it is important not only to explore the stimuli and ability of party leaders to identify who has more potential to be an effective minister. We must also contemplate the ability of party leaders to make the intended changes, that is, to explore how the political context constrains party leaders on the whole, and prime ministers in particular to promote the desired changes in government cabinet composition. For instance, if forming a coalition government involves inter-party negotiations on ministerial portfolios allocation, it poses difficulties for the prime minister to replace an official, than in single-party majority governments. It is also important that restrictions on ministerial shift should, hypothetically, be stricter in minimum-win coalitions than in excess-win coalitions, as ministers of the so-called «untypical» cabinets can be dismissed without the entire government resignation. For this reason, single-party majority governments, considered the most stable in comparative-political studies, are apt to relatively high levels of ministerial reshuffle, as in such cabinets prime ministers are free to resort to political uncertainty, inherent in personnel decision-making. Instead, less stable coalition governments are reducing the ability of party leaders to re-appoint or dismiss people from ministerial posts. It is noteworthy that the rules of government formation affect the political actors' political expenses, involved in the reallocation of ministerial portfolios. In countries whose legislation requires an investiture vote, party leaders not only agree on the details of government forming, but also face greater operational costs over ministerial reshuffles, as the latter require a new investiture vote. Respectively, it is reasonable to expect that the relationship of the individual minister's party towards the Prime Minister's party will inevitably affect the reshuffle of government portfolios. In particular, it is obvious that restrictions are binding on all members of the Prime Minister's party. For example, if Christian Democrats and Liberals

²² Epstein D., O'Halloran S., *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

form a government coalition led by a Liberal prime minister, then the latter has much more power to make reshuffles of portfolios, held by Liberal ministers than those, held by Democratic ministers. Thus, if ministerial stability is influenced by uncertainty about portfolio allocation and in case appointment constraints reduce the frequency of desirable reshuffles, the members of the prime minister's party have more influence than members of other government parties²³. Further on, restriction on portfolio reshuffles should additionally affect the change of ministers within government cabinets. For instance, in some parties, including the British Conservatives, inner rules provide their leaders with considerable autonomy. Instead, other parties, including the British Labour Party, have far fewer powers, respectively restricting government cabinet ministers²⁴.

Another ministerial stability analysis indicator is the so-called ministerial turnover. According to K. Strom, it is defined as a sum of the share of parliamentary seats, held by parties leaving the cabinet and the share of parliamentary seats of those, forming the cabinet²⁵. In cases when general elections occur between two successive government cabinets, such calculations should be based on the post-election parliament composition. Therefore, ministerial turnover is the index of returning officials to their posts. It provides information on the likelihood of partner cooperation in the next government coalition if the current government cabinet ceases to exist. Additionally, ministerial turnover affects the incentives of coalition government cabinet partners and can be interpreted as an indicator of the likelihood of a government support loss. Depending on the nature of the phenomena underlying the ministerial stability analysis variables, different forms of ministerial danger can be pointed out. Certainly, relationship between interdependence of time and the processes, leading to the collapse of the government cabinet are widely discussed. On the one hand, E. Browne argues that events that tend to precede the resignation of a government cabinet occur regardless of the structural features of the political system. Therefore, in terms of the governments' survival analysis, a government is likely to resign throughout the entire government cabinet term of office and hence it is worth speaking about the potential danger of governmental «survival». On the other hand, P. Warwick suggests that the main process leading to the government resignation is not a random coincidence of a particular point in time and certain factors in the government performance.

In this regard, J. Huber argues that government portfolio volatility (ministerial turnover) is of utter significance²⁶. So, in conditions of high volatility, ministers hold offices for a relatively short period of time, while in contrast, senior civil servants face much lower thresholds for ministerial reshuffles. Therefore, considerable ministerial portfolios volatility is regarded as

²³ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²⁴ Huber J., Martinez-Gallardo C., *Cabinet Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Columbia University 2003.

²⁵ Strom K. Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1984, vol 79, s. 738–754.

²⁶ Huber J., How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 1998, vol 92, s. 577–591.

a potential cause for ineffective decision-making. Moreover, since ministerial reshuffles are calculated by comparing the portfolio allocation between two successive government cabinets, several hypothetical situations can occur: the portfolio will be assigned to a retiring minister; the portfolio will be assigned to a new minister, belonging to the previous minister's resigning party; the new minister will not represent the previous minister's party; the portfolio will be eliminated altogether; a new portfolio and possibly a new ministry will be added. In reality, each of the abovementioned situations, except for the first, gives rise to a new form of ministerial volatility. However, the difference between the second and third situations is obvious. In the first case, some information surplus between the two ministers from the same party is quite likely. In the second case, especially if the two parties are far apart from each other in the right-left ideological spectrum, a limited information surplus occurs. Therefore, two different volatility measures will be calculated. The full government cabinet portfolio volatility is the sum of the number of changes in all government government portfolios holders and the number of removed and added ministerial portfolios.

In this regard, M. Laver and K. Shepsle elaborated the concept of a «strong party». A Party S will be strong if it participates in every government, passed on to cabinets where Party S gets all the portfolios. However, even if a strong party acquires significant market political power, it can still find itself on the brink of dismissal from government cabinet»²⁷. Moreover, if individual ministers did not experience government and party dependence, there would be no difference between the ministries, therefore «the balance between individual ministerial autonomy and collective cabinet decision-making plays a crucial and ultimate role in predicting efficiency and stability»²⁸.

This stipulates elaboration of an additional method of analyzing ministerial stability, which employs an indicator of estimation of relative ministerial weights. This method combines the model of operations for a government cabinet formation with the maximum likelihood of such a government cabinet. The data that is needed for estimation is information about who the formateur is, what each party's voting weight is, what government portfolios each party obtains. In addition, this approach enables to estimate effects and benefits of the roles of formateurs and ministers²⁹. Thus, relative ministerial weights suggest that each party benefits from government formation, although the political power of the formateur is dominant³⁰. It is particularly noticeable, given the fact that even following a government cabinet formation and obtaining ministerial posts, each party is unique, since different ministerial posts have

²⁷ Laver M., Shepsle K., Coalitions and Cabinet Government, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, s. 873–889.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

²⁸ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda*, [w:] *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in Honor of J. F. Blondel*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1994.

²⁹ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

³⁰ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

a very different and variable weight. However, how important is a minister's post compared to another minister's post? Despite the importance of this issue, comparative studies do not provide a clear statistical method for estimating ministerial weights. In this respect S. Ansolabehere, J. Snyder, A. Strauss, M. Ting³¹ argue that «this is a common problem of coalition government research.» Yet the issue is aggravated by the fact that ministerial weights indicate not only the party's actual profits from forming government offices, but also the importance and cost of participating in certain ministries. The point is that each party's policy area is of the highest ministerial importance, likewise the government portfolio that determines party spending is also of the utmost significance. In this light, the so-called weights are relevant to the analysis of income, derived from holding portfolios, that is, to the impact of a government party size upon the size of its ministerial, governmental and political influence. Once the «Hamson Rule» was introduced, according to which «the share of posts for a party in a government cabinet is proportional to their relative size in the coalition»³². However, at present, it is believed that various ministerial posts still have different governmental and political weights, susceptible to change over time³³. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to estimate the importance of all government parties by ministerial posts they hold, as this is a volatile phenomenon. In turn it means that changing the weight of ministerial positions can significantly determine the change in the stability of certain ministerial positions³⁴.

All considered, the present study found that ministerial reshuffles, ministerial turnover, and ministerial stability largely account for government stability, yet being directly dependent on factors that determine governmental stability. The study argues that ministerial stability can also be viewed as an independent factor in the study of government performance, for it can independently answer questions, concerning peculiarities of formation, performance and responsibility of governments. Against this background, it was found that ministerial stability and ministerial reshuffle depend on the following factors: as the level of uncertainty in the selection of a potential cabinet official, the importance of political and technical expertise of a future official, the degree of inter-ministerial trust in government, the limitation of appointments and dismissal. Simultaneously, ministerial stability is largely determined by the weight of different ministerial posts, which is crucial for both parties and individual politicians.

³¹ Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., Strauss A., Ting M., *Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University 2003, s. 18

³² Gamson W., A Theory of Coalition Formation, *"American Sociological Review"* 1961, vol 26, s. 373–382.

³³ Browne E., Franklin M., Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies, *"American Political Science Review"* 1973, vol 67, s. 453–469.; Browne E., Frendreis J., Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations, *"American Journal of Political Science"* 1980, vol 24, s. 753–768.; Warwick P., Druckman J., Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments, *"British Journal of Political Science"* 2001, vol 31, s. 627–649.; Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., Strauss A., Ting M., *Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments*, Wyd. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Columbia University 2003, s. 18

³⁴ Adachi T., Watanabe Y., *Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania 2004.

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